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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION:
FEDERALISM AND FAIRNESS AS FUNCTIONS OF MINIMUM
CONTACTS- A CONCEPTUAL FAILURE
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980)
Respondents purchased a new automobile in their home state of New
York and were later involved in a collision in Oklahoma.' Subsequently, they
brought a product liability suit in Oklahoma naming the automobile's retailer
and regional wholesaler, inter alios, as defendants. 2 At a special appearance, 3
the trial court rejected defendant's due process claims and sustained in personam jurisdiction based only on the vehicle in question. 4 Denying a writ of
prohibition, 5 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held it reasonable to presume
that petitioner's vehicles are periodically used in that state.6 On writ of
1. 100 S. Ct. 559, 562 (1980). Respondents, Harry and Kay Robinson, moved from New
York to Arizona a year after purchasing a new Audi automobile. While travelling through
Oklahoma, Mrs. Robinson and her two children were severely burned when their Audi
was struck from the rear. The ensuing complaint alleged that their injuries were proximately
caused by the defective design and placement of the vehicle's gas tank and fuel system. Id.
2. Id. at 562-63. The suit named as defendants, Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellscheft,
the manufacturer; Volkswagen of America, Inc., the importer; World-Wide Volkswagen
Corporation, the regional distributor for Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York; and Seaway
Volkswagen, Inc., the retail dealer. The manufacturer and the importer distributed automobiles and parts nationwide to independent regional wholesalers, who in turn sold to
retailers, all on a contractual basis. Id.
3. The petitioners in the instant case were joined in the special appearance by Volkswagen of America, Inc. but that party did not seek review by a higher court. Id. at 562 n.3.
4. Id. at 563. The respondents produced no evidence at the special appearance to
indicate that petitioners did any business in Oklahoma, had an agent there, or advertised
in a medium calculated to reach the forum. Respondent's counsel conceded at oral arguments, before the instant Court, that no showing was made of any contact with Oklahoma
beyond the Robinson's vehicle. Id.
5. A writ of prohibition is an order directed to an inferior court, commanding it to
cease prosecution of a case or claim because the matter does not belong to that jurisdiction.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARy 1090-91 (5th ed. 1979).

6. 100 S. Ct. at 563-64, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351
(Okla. 1978). The Oklahoma high court found the statutory basis for jurisdiction in the
state's long arm statute, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §1701.03A(4) (West Supp. 1979-1980), which
allows jurisdiction over a defendant who "caus[es] tortious injury in this state by an act or
omission outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business . . . or derives substantial
revenue from goods used in this state." Id. The court expressly rejected the trial court's reliance on a different section of the same statute which permits jurisdiction if the defendant,
"caus[es] tortious injury in this state by an act or ommission in this state." 12 OKLA.
STAT. ANN., tit. 12 §1701.03A(3) (West Supp. 1979-1980). The Supreme Court of Oklahoma
reasoned that although the injury occurred in the state, the allegedly negligent acts took
place elsewhere. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 353-54 (Okla. 1978).
Although the Oklahoma court recognized that the proper jurisdictional test included both
a constitutional and statutory examination, it failed to distinguish the two in its reasoning.
The court held merely that the availability of the automobile and petitioner's participation
in a nationwide service network allowed the presumption that substantial income was
derived from vehicles which, "from time to time are used in the State of Oklahoma." Id. at
353-54.
The instant Court suggested that the failure to distinguish between the statutory and
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certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and HELD, petitioners
lacked sufficient contacts with the forum to reasonably anticipate being haled
before its courts, thus in personam jurisdiction offended principles of federalism and due process.7
In the 1877 landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 8 the United States Supreme
Court held that a state's in personam judgment against a natural person, not
physically present in the forum, was violative of due process, and thus not
entitled to full faith and credit. 9 The Court reasoned that jurisdiction was
the physical power to serve process, and was therefore valid only if served
within the state.10 As a result, in personam jurisdiction could be exercised over
a defendant only momentarily present in a forum only if served with process
at that time. 1
Similarly, in personam jurisdiction over corporate defendants was available
only in the state of incorporation.i This view was predicated on the theory
constitutional basis for jurisdiction was probably because the Oklahoma long arm statute
has been interpreted to mirror the constitutional boundaries of jurisdiction. 100 S. Ct. at 563 &
n. 8. See Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976); Carmack v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 536 P.2d 897 (Okla. 1975); Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460
(Okla. 1970).
7. 100 S.Ct. 559 (1980).
8. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). In Pennoyer, petitioner brought an action to recover a tract of land
in Oregon sold to the respondent under a sheriff's deed to satisfy an 1866 in personam
judgment. Id. at 719-20. Petitioner maintained that because Oregon neither served him with
process nor attached the land in question, the judgment, and thus the respondents title,
were invalid. Id. at 720. Moreover, petitioner was not in Oregon to receive a summons and
the property was not conveyed to him until after the judgment was rendered. The respondent,
however, argued that after an attempt to serve process, notice of summons was made by
publication and upon petitioner's failure to appear, judgment was entered by default. Id.
9. Id. at 729, 733. Although based on the full faith and credit clause and the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, the Court's reasoning was intended to apply to the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process
Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts from Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 569, 572 (1958).

10. 95 U.S. at 727-28. For a discussion and criticism of this rule, see generally Ehrenzweig,
The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens,
65 YAIX L.J. 289 (1956); Rheinstein, Michigan Legal Studies: A Review, 41 MIcH. L. REv.
83 (1942).
11. 95 U.S. at 727-28. An extreme example of this principle was evident in Grace v.
MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959), where in personam jurisdiction was upheld
soley because the defendant was served with process while flying above the forum in an
airplane. However, there seems to be general agreement that this theory was discredited
by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: PersonalJurisdiction After Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 20 Amiz. L. REv. 861, 865 (1978).

12. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 U.S. (1 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839). For a discussion of the
history of corporate jurisdiction, see generally Hoffman, The Plastic Frontiers of State
Judicial Power Over Non-reiidents: McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 24 BROoKLYN L.
REv. 291 (1958); Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of Quasi
in Rem and in Personam Principles,1978 DuE L. REv. 1147 (1978); Seidelson, Jurisdiction
Over Nonresident Defendants: Beyond Minimum Contacts and the Long Arm Statutes, 6
DUQ. L. REv. 221 (1968); Developments in the Law: State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 909, 911 (1960).
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that a corporation is a creature of the state, whose legal existence cannot exceed
beyond the boundaries of its creator. 13 As the corporate form increased in
popularity, however, less restrictive jurisdictional fictions evolved. The first,
consent,' 4 was soon followed by the presence doctrine. 15 Combining both of
these, the subsequent doing business theory required that the defendant do
sufficient business in the forum to imply consent to process or infer presence
in the state. 6
The growth of modern transportation and commerce led to a need for
more workable jurisdictional doctrines for both corporations and individuals.'7
This search culminated in 1945 with InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.8
In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that in personam jurisdiction was consistent with due process 5 if minimum contacts existed with the
13. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 588.
14. The consent theory reasoned that by conducting transactions in the forum, the
corporation implicitly consented to have a state official receive service of process as its
agent. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 404 (1855). See also Kalo, supra note 12, at 1166-76; Kurland, supra note 9, at 578-79.
15. The presence doctrine implicitly rejected Bank of Augusta v. Earle, see note 12
supra, by permitting jurisdiction over a corporation doing sufficient business in the state to
warrant the inference that it was present. See, e.g., Philadelphia & Reading R. Ry. Co. v.
McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898). See also
Kalo, supra note 12, at 1176-80; Kurland, supra note 9, at 582-84.
16. The doing business concept did not achieve notoriety by its use in a single key
decision. Rather, it resulted from confused distinctions between the consent and presence
doctrines. Kurland, supra note 9 at 584-86. Judge Hand, in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert,
45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930), illustrated only a few. "Possibly the maintenance of a regular
agency for the solicitation of business will serve without more. The [negative] answer in
Green v. C.B. & Q. RR. Co., 205 U.S. 530 [(1907)] . . . and Peoples Tob. Co. v. Amer.
Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 [(1918)] . . . becomes somewhat doubtful in light of International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 [(1914)] . . ." Id. at 141. Judge Hand continued in this
style, citing other contradictory holdings, finally holding that "[it is quite impossible to
establish any rule from the decided cases, we must step from tuft to tuft across the morass."
Id. at 142. See also Kalo, supra note 12, at 1180-82.
17. Kalo, supra note 12, at 586; Kurland, supra note 9, at 1182-83; Comment, In Personam
Jurisdiction: Quality v. Quantity -A Dilemma in the Fifth Circuit, 31 U. FLA. L. REV.
658, 659-60 (1979).
18. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Appellant, International Shoe Co. was a Delaware corporation
having its principal place of business in Missouri. It maintained no offices, made no
contracts and kept no merchandise in Washington. Appellant, however, employed 11 to 13
salesmen who resided and worked as solicitors in the forum state. It also, on occasion, rented
display rooms in the forum for use by the salesmen. However, the salesmen's authority was
restricted to solicitation of orders that were subject to appellant's approval once received in
Missouri. Finally, all merchandise shipped into Washington was F.O.B. Id. at 310-11.
The State of Washington, pursuant to a valid statute, sought to collect the employer's
contribution for unemployment compensation from appellant. Upon appellant's refusal, the
State served process on one of the salesmen as an agent for the company. The Supreme
Court of Washington upheld jurisdiction, reasoning that appellant's business in the state
was sufficient to constitute "doing business." On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
rejected the doing business factor but affirmed based upon the new minimum contacts test.
Id. For a contemporaneous view of International Shoe, see generally McBane, Jurisdiction
Over Foreign Corporations:Actions Arising out of Acts Done Within the Forum, 34 CAL. L.
REv. 331 (1946).
19. U.S. CONsT. amend XIV, §1. The International Shoe Court based its holding ex-
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forum such that jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice. Further, the decision applied to individual and
corporate defendants, thus abolishing the fictive basis for corporate jurisdiction.21 Recognizing the complexities of interstate relationships, the Court
held that even a single act is not an improbable basis for jurisdiction. 22 The
InternationalShoe approach 23 thus mandated a case by case analysis to determine if jurisdiction would be fair and just. Because InternationalShoe offered
no criterion for application, however, lower courts were inconsistent in applying
21
this new fairness test.
clusively on the due process clause and explicitly rejected reliance on the commerce clause
to resolve jurisdictional issues. 326 U.S. at 315. But see Erlenger Mills, Inc. v. Cajhoes Fibre
Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956) (nonresident defendant's only forum connection was
shipment of goods into the state F.O.B.; therefore, the court held that commerce would be
burdened if jurisdiction was allowed to rest on that act).
20. 326 U.S. at 316.
21. Id. at 319. Although InternationalShoe purported to destroy the fictions of corporate
jurisdiction, id. at 318, it did not overrule the older cases applying those doctrines. Rather, a
substantial effort was made to remain consistent with those decisions. See Kurland, supra
note 9, at 586.
22. 326 U.S. at 318. The single act as a basis for in personam jurisdiction has been one
of the most controversial and inconsistently applied elements of International Shoe. Reese &
Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of JudicialJurisdiction,44 IowA L.
REv. 249, 258-64 (1959); See also Kurland, supra note 9 at 592. Developments in the Law,
supra note 12 at 925-30; Note, In Personam jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in
Product Liability Actions, 63 Micfr. L. REv. 1028, 1031-35 (1965).
The single act has been held sufficient to allow jurisdiction most often when the -act

was subject to special state regulation. E.g., Traveler's Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643
(1950) (jurisdiction permitted over a nonresident insurance company operating a mail order
business resulting in forum policyholders and a claims agent in the state); Hess v. Pawloski,

274 U.S. 352 (1927) (a state may, as a prerequisite to use of its highways, require nonresident
motorists to appoint a state official as agent to receive process). Cf. McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (jurisdiction was permitted where nonresident insurer
solicited a single insurance policy by mail from within the forum).
Jurisdiction based on a tortious act causing a single injury in the forum faced more
opposition. See, e.g., Charia v. Cigarette Racing Team, Inc., 583 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1978) (no
jurisdiction permitted over nonresident boat manufacturer that conducted negotiations in
the forum, advertised in a nationwide magazine, and shipped an allegedly defective boat into
the forum F.O.B.); Kerrigan v. Clarke Gravel Corp., 71 F.R.D. 480 (M.D. Penn. 1975) (jurisdiction denied over nonresident tractor dealer who was allegedly negligent in repairing
plaintiff's tractor, thus causing injury in the forum); Beal v. Caldwell, 322 F. Supp. 1151
(E.D. Tenn. 1970) (jurisdiction denied over nonresident who advertised an allegedly defective
airplane in a nationwide trade magazine and communicated with the resident buyer by telephone and post). But see Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 IM1.2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) (jurisdiction allowed over nonresident manufacturer of a
component part for a hot water heater manufactured and assembled out of state but causing
an injury in state); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Co., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951)
(jurisdiction upheld over nonresident who was allegedly negligent in repairing a resident's
roo .
23. International Shoe was a 7-1-0 decision. Justice Black concurred, but rejected the
majority's reliance on the "uncertain elements" and "vague Constitutional criterion" in favor
of the well established rule that states may tax corporations whose agents work in the state.
326 U.S. at 322-26 (Black, J., concurring).
24. See note 22-supra; notes 32-38 infra. See generally Developments in the Law, supra
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The Court did little to expand on International Shoe until some twenty
years later 25 in McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co.6 In McGee, a nonresident insurance company was held amenable to suit based on a single
insurance policy solicited by mail from within the forum state. Reinforcing
the single act language of InternationalShoe, the isolated contract was held
to be a sufficient connection with the forum. 27 More generally, the McGee
Court recognized a trend toward expansion of in personam jurisdiction,28
acknowledging the State's interest in providing a forum for its residents.2 9
The opportunity to expand on McGee was soon limited,30 however, by
Hanson v. Denckla.31 The Hanson Court held that a Florida court could not
assert jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee, 2 whose only contact with the
forum was a series of communications with the settlor subsequent to her
creation of the Delaware trust and relocation in Florida. The Court distinguished McGee,33 noting that jurisdiction was improperly based on the
note 22; Note, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: An Interest Balancing
Test, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 33 (1967).
25. From International Shoe in 1945 until McGee in 1957, the Supreme Court adhered
to a non-interference policy in the area of in personam jurisdiction. This was accomplished
by use of the fairness test from International Shoe which left the propriety of personal
jurisdiction to the trial court, as a question of fact. Kurland, supra note 9 at 610. But cf.
Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (jurisdiction upheld over
a Philippine corporation, temporarily operating in the forum during World War II, in a
suit unrelated to activities in the forum; "systematic and continuous" contacts).
26. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The defendant was a Texas insurance company that had no
offices, agents or contacts with California beyond the single insurance policy in question.
The plaintiff, beneficiary under the policy, obtained a judgment in California and sought
full faith and credit in Texas. That state's courts refused, holding the California judgment
invalid for want of jurisdiction over the defendant. On writ of certiorari, the Supreme
Court upheld the California judgment. Id.

27. Id. at 223.
28. Id. at 222.
29. Id. at 223.
30. Only one year separated McGee from Hanson, thus lower courts had little opportunity to construe the first decision free from the influence of the latter. Commentators,
however, have been able to separate the decisions in theory. See, e.g., Carrington & Martin,
Substantive Interests and the Jurisdictionof State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REv. 227, 235-36 (1967);

von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L.
REv. 1121, 1160-79 (1966).
31. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Dora Browning Donner executed a trust in Delaware in 1935
naming the defendant as trustee. The beneficiaries were eventually named by inter vivos
instruments. Donner then moved to Florida but remained in contact with the trustee,
received income from the trust and executed instruments persuant to it. Upon Donner's
death, the residuary legatees under her will successfully challenged the validity of the
appointment of the beneficiaries in Florida courts. A contrary result was reached, however,
when the executrix initiated a similar suit in Delaware courts. Both cases were taken together
on writ of certiorari and the United States Supreme Court held that Florida did not have
in personam jurisdiction over the trustee, thus the Delaware judgment was affirmed. Id. at 256.
32. Prior to consideration of in personam jurisdiction, the Hanson court rejected in rem
jurisdiction by Florida courts over the trust assets. In rem is the authority to determine
title in property present in the jurisdiction, equally binding on all, and taking no
cognizance of the claimants' domiciles. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 713 (5th ed. 1979). The Court
noted that determination of the situs of intangible property is difficult. However, in Hanson
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settlor's unilateral move; therefore the trustee had not purposely availed
itself of the privileges and benefits of forum laws. 34 Reaffirming the existence
of limits on in personam jurisdiction, the Hanson Court rejected any move
toward nationwide jurisdiction. 35 In general, McGee and Hanson indicated a
clear intent by the Court to remain consistent with the International Shoe
doctrine3 6
The Supreme Court was again silent for two decades and inevitable inconsistencies developed between many lower courts. Some remained within
the spirit of InternationalShoe and its progeny,37 while others gradually exthe issue was easily resolved because the record failed to indicate any presence of trust
assets in Florida. Further, in rem could not attach in a probate court merely because the
decedent domiciled in the forum. Rather, the property must be affiliated with the state to
assert in rem jurisdiction. 357 U.S. 246-49. For a detailed examination of the Florida Long
Arm Statute, see Note, In Personam-Due Process and Florida's Short "Long Arm," 23 U.
FLA. L. REv. 336 (1971).
33. See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
34. 357 U.S. at 251-53. The "purposely avail" language was not the creation of the
Hanson Court. Rather, it can be traced to InternationalShoe. See 326 U.S. at 316.
35. 357 U.S. at 251. Justice Black, joined by Justices Brennan and Burton, dissented,
maintaining that the trustee had sufficient contacts to assure that Florida jurisdiction was
not unfair. Further, Florida's interest in the efficient administration of Donner's will and
the examination of choice of law criterion also favored jurisdiction. The dissent concluded
by criticizing the majority for adhering to "principles stated the better part of a century
ago in Pennoyer v. Neff." Id. at 259. See text accompanying notes 8-11, 35 supra.
36. See text accompanying notes 27-35 supra; Woods, supra note 11 at 868. Throughout
McGee and Hanson, the Court relied on concepts and language from International Shoe.
Implicit in those decisions was a continuation of the International Shoe reasoning with only
slight deviation to accommodate different factual situations. However, parallel with the
Court's silence in the following decade, and with the trend toward expansion of jurisdiction
by lower courts, commentators maintained that a general broadening of jurisdictional
bounds was not inconsistent with McGee and Hanson. See, e.g., Foster, Judicial Economy;
Fairness and Convenience of Place of Trial: Long-arm Jurisdiction in District Courts, 47
F.R.D. 73, 92 (1968).
37. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Western Boat Bldg. Corp., 472 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1975) (jurisdiction denied in Louisiana because contacts were due to plaintiff's unilateral actions when he
contracted with nonresident defendant in North Carolina to build and deliver a boat in
Washington; the only forum contacts were sporadic communications by mail and telephone
prior to delivery), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 830 (1973); ing v. Hailey Chevrolet Co., 462 F.2d
63 (6th Cir. 1972) (jurisdiction permitted over nonresident's business that advertised in trade
magazines and repaired plaintiff's truck with knowledge of its intended return to the
forum); Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965) (jurisdiction upheld
over nonresident manufacturer of allegedly defective equipment that had been shipped
directly into the forum for years, along with parts and advertising brochures); L. D. Reeder
Contractors of Arizona v. Higgins Indus., 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959) (jurisdiction denied
over a nonresident manufacturer whose only contact with the forum was acceptance and
negotiation of a single contract for sale of goods with another nonresident for delivery in a
different state); Timberlake v. Summers, 413 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (minimum
contacts held not to exist in a libel action where defendant's only contact with the state was
the allegedly libelous letter); Upgren v. Executive Aviation Servs., 304 F. Supp. 165 (D. Minn.
1969) (jurisdiction refused when nonresident defendant's only contact was an allegedly defective helicopter sold to a nonresident, but causing injury in the forum); Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E. 761 (1961) (nonresident manufacturer of a component part held for in-state injury even though assembly was out of state).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol32/iss4/9

6

Goodkind: Constitutional Law--In Personam Jurisdiction: Federalism and Fair
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII

panded their jurisdictional boundaries38 However, nationwide jurisdiction was
again rejected by the Court in 1977 in Shaffer v. Heitner.39 In that case, Delaware courts sought to "coerce" 40 in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents
lacking minimum contacts by attaching in state property. While the case
centered on quasi in rem jurisdiction, the Court again relied upon the in
personam minimum contacts test. 41 The Shaffer Court, however, introduced
a new element to the International Shoe doctrine: the extent to which a
42
defendant would reasonably anticipate being haled before a forum's courts.
However, the Court appeared to attach no significance to the new language,
and thus, lower courts failed to preserve any change in the area of in personam
3
jurisdiction.
38. Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966) (when
defendant's only contact with the forum was the unexplained presence of a single plate that
exploded in plaintiff's oven, the Court rejected the language of Hanson and remanded for
consideration of the economic strength of the parties, size of the defendant corporation,
judicial economy, and "all other matters relevant"); Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545
P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976) (jurisdiction upheld over a nonresident, interstate truck
driver for injuries resulting from a collision outside the forum with a resident plaintiff of
the forum; jurisdiction was based on defendant's past routes that had brought him to the
forum and his intent to enter the forum); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d
893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969) (jurisdiction upheld based upon the unexplained
presence in the forum of a very large, nearly immovable boiler manufactured by the defendant); Roche v. Floral Rental Corp., 95 N.J. Super. 555, 232 A.2d 162 (1967) (jurisdiction
permitted over a defendant with no contacts beyond the installation of a refrigerator unit
on plaintiff's truck, defendant knowing the truck was to return to the forum).
39. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Plaintiff filed a stockholder's derivative suit against past and
present officers of a Delaware corporation, in that state, alleging, inter alia, that defendants
violated their duties to the corporation resulting in civil and criminal liabilities. Simultaneously, plaintiff attached 83,000 shares of common stock in the corporation belonging to
19 of the 28 defendants. Defendant's special appearance was ultimately rejected by the
Delaware supreme court, Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976), holding
that sequestration to compel in personam jurisdiction, with failure to appear resulting in
default, did not deny due process of law and was not controlled by International Shoe. The
United States Supreme Court reversed and drastically altered principles of in rem jurisdiction
by requiring that they satisfy International Shoe standards. 433 U.S. at 186.
40. Id. at 219. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the case, while Justices Powell and
Stevens concurred separately and Justice Brennan concurred in part and dissented in part.
Justice Powell agreed with the majority, subject to the reservation that quasi in rem jurisdiction remain available for real property located in the forum. Id. at 217. Justice Stevens agreed
with Powell and the majority but emphasized the practical consequences of Delaware's action.
Specifically, the purchaser of any stock in a Delaware corporation may be subject to suit in
that state or face forfeiture of his investment. Id. at 217-19.
Justice Brennan agreed with the Court's application of minimum contacts to in rem
actions, but disagreed with the Court's result under that test. He suggested that the case
should have been remanded for application of the minimum contacts test. However, because
the Court ruled on it, he expressed the view that a state has a legitimate interest in
assuring a convenient forum for derivative suits and Delaware was a fair and convenient
forum. Id. at 219-28.
41. Id. at 207-12.
42. Id. at 216. In the closing paragraph of its opinion, after mentioning the purposeful
availment test of Hanson v. Denckla, see text accompanying notes 31-36 supra, the Court
noted that "appellants had no reason to expect to be haled before a Delaware Court." Id.
43. The positioning of the phrase within the opinion and the tone of the paragraph,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [1980], Art. 9
1980]

CASE COMMENTS

The instant case"4 represented an attempt by the Court to resolve conflicts
between lower courts and provide guidelines for future cases.4 5 In doing so,
the present Court declined to expand the jurisdictional boundaries established
by InternationalShoe and its progeny." Rather, the Court propounded two
functions of the minimum contacts concept: overall fairness and maintenance
of the federal system.4 7 In terms of fairness, minimum contacts were said to
ensure that jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.48 Further, while acknowledging the trend toward relaxation
of jurisdictional requirements, 49 the Court maintained that federalism and the
seem to indicate that the Court did not intend this language to be adopted as another
element of the International Shoe doctrine. The instant case, however, indicates otherwise.
See text accompanying notes 47-52 infra. See Woods, supra note 11 at 867-68 (the Shaffer
Court failed to define the Internationdl Shoe standards and that their definition will continue
to elude courts and commentators). Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), reversed a
California Supreme Court judgment permitting the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a child support suit. The only forum contacts were defendant's acts
that caused his two children to leave his domicile in New Jersey and travel to their mother
in the forum state. In applying the traditional International Shoe test, the Court noted a
distinction between commercial and non-commercial activity in determining the scope of
jurisdiction. Also acknowledged, but again in a secondary manner, was the new element
from Shaffer. Id.
Lower courts also attributed little significance to the "haled before a forum court" test.
See, e.g., Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978) (the Fifth
Circuit conducted an exhaustive evaluation on the issue of in personam jurisdiction, including
several citations to Shaffer, but no mention was made of the new test); Hutson v. Fehr Bros.,
Inc., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978) (an extensive review of in personam jurisdiction in a
product liability suit heavily cited Shaffer and its predecessors, but ignored the new test);
Swafford v. Avakian, 581 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1978) (in an action for breach of promise
against a nonresident, the court, in considering jurisdiction, cited Kulko, but not the new
test); School Dist. v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (in a school segregation
case, the court considered jurisdiction over Kansas officials alleged to have contributed to
the segregation and denied jurisdiction by an extensive use of the InternationalShoe test, but
failed to mention Shaffer).
44. 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980). The Court's disposition of the instant case included a majority
opinion by Justice White joined by five others and dissenting opinions by Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun separately, with Justice Blackmun also joining Justice Marshall.
45. Id. at 564 n. 9. The Court explicitly recognized a conflict between the Oklahoma
supreme court and the high courts of four other states in cases with identical facts. Granite
States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624 (1972) (defendant knew
of plaintiff's intent to take the vehicle to the forum); Tilley v. Keller Truck & Implement
Corp., 200 Kan. 641, 438 P.2d 128 (1968); Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974)
(expressly rejected the mobility and service network arguments); Oliver v. American Motors
Corp., 70 Wash. 2d 875, 425 P.2d 647 (1967) (dicta indicated that jurisdiction would be
proper if defendant knew of plaintiff's intent to enter the forum).
46. 100 S. Ct. at 563, quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958).
47. 100 S. Ct. at 564.
48. Id. As considerations of fair play and substantial justice, the Court included the
plaintiff's interest in convenient relief, the forum's interest, reasonableness of requiring the
corporation to defend in the forum, and principles of judicial economy. Id.
49. Id. at 565, quoting McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
By the Court's reasoning, modern technology and an increase in commerce have rendered
previously unfair jurisdiction reasonable and just. See generally Kurland, supra note 9; Woods,

supranote 11.
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sovereignty of sister states required a limit on the reach of a state's judiciary.5 0
Federalism, the Court held, was preserved only if a defendant's acts constituted
a purposeful availment of forum laws so as to reasonably anticipate being held
before its courts. 51 Accordingly, even if all considerations of fairness are satisfied, principles of federalism could prevent a state from rendering a valid
52
judgment.
Because the respondents failed to satisfy the federalism test, the instant
53
Court found it unnecessary to consider notions of fairness and reasonableness.
Specifically, the Court reasoned that respondent's vehicle, petitioner's only
contact with Oklahoma, was in that state due to the unilateral actions of
others.5 4 Further, the petitioners had not tried to serve the forum market
either indirectly or by placing its products in the stream of commerce.5 5 Therefore, the Court concluded, the petitioners could not have reasonably foreseen a
suit in Oklahoma. 56
Justice Brennan's dissent- 'rejected substantial reliance on International
Shoe as outdated. 58 Rather, under this view, minimum contacts should only
be a part of the overall focus on reasonableness, justice and fair play. 59 Although this fairness test was similar to that of the majority, it expressly rejected consideration of the burden of defending in a distant forum. 6
While the instant Court indicated a refusal to expand the constitutional
boundaries of in personam jurisdiction, 61 the present case was seemingly
50. 100 S. Ct. at 565.
51. Id. at 565-67. The Court was particularly concerned with providing a degree of
predictability so potential defendants could better structure their conduct. Id.
52. Id. at 565-66.
53. Id. at 568.
54. Id. at 566.
55. Id at 567. The stream of commerce theory has been popular since its adoption by
the Illinois supreme court in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.
2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). Although that court did not name the theory, it described it
as the general proposition that, "if a corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in
another state, it is not unjust to hold it answerable [to jurisdiction in that state] . . ." Id. at
439, 176 N.E.2d at 766. Accord, Cleary, The Length of the Long Arm, 9 J. PuB. L. 293, 296-98
(1960); Seidelson, supra note 12, at 227-28; Note, supra note 22 at 1032-34. See also Jetco
Electronic Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973); Burton Shipyard, Inc. v.
Williams, 448 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1971); Jones Enterprises, Inc. v. Atlas Serv. Corp., 442 F.2d
1136 (9th Cir. 1971); Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969).
56. 100 S. Ct. at 566-67. The Court rejected the Supreme Court of Oklahoma's reasoning.
Rather, the mobility of the automobile notwithstanding, mere foreseeability of a product
being taken into the forum is not sufficient. The relevant foreseeability is based on purposeful conduct, the defendant might be haled before a forum court. Id.
57. 100 S. Ct. at 580 (this dissent is applicable to the instant case and a sister case, Rush
v. Savchuk, 100 S. Ct. 571 (1980)).
58. 100 S. Ct. at 581.
59. Id. at 581-82. Brennan's focus on reasonableness, fair play and justice basically
included those considerations enunciated in the majority's fairness test. See note 48 supra.
60. 100 S. Ct. at 582. The two other dissents agreed with the substance of the majority's
test, but reached a different result. They emphasized the uniqueness of the automobile and
the nationwide service network. Further, the dissents maintained that due to these characteristics, the defendants could have foreseen their alleged negligence causing injury in the
forum. 100 S. Ct. at 568. (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 570 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. 100 S. Ct. at 565, quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958).
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consistent with past doctrine. InternationalShoe and minimum contacts were
reaffirmed, 2 as were tie purposeful availnment and unilateral action tests of
McGee and Hanson.63 Expanding on Shaffer, great emphasis was placed on the
defendant's ability to anticipate being haled before a forum court.0 4 Further,
the Court was careful to resolve past ambiguities by confirming theories previously only implied. For example, jurisdiction based on advertisements reaching the forum state 5 and the stream of commerce theory 0 were favorably
acknowledged. Aware of explicit boundaries, however, the Court rejected
jurisdiction based on unforeseen circumstancesr and questioned the validity of
presuming continuous contacts upon proof of only a single forum connection.6 8
The only deviation from precedent was a shift in methodology; a new two
pronged test was set forth.6 9 Specifically, minimum contacts were said to serve
the dual function of preserving federalism and ensuring fairness. The Court
maintained that even if jurisdiction was fair to the defendant, the Constitution required that federalism be respected.70 The necessary implication of this
approach is that concerns of federalism remain constitutionally based, while
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice assume a subservient
71
role.
In applying this new Constitutional test, however, the Court inadequately
addressed critical facts and overlooked a major inconsistency. With only a
conclusory explanation, the Court dismissed as irrelevant the unique mobility
of the automobile,7 2 as well as petitioner's membership in a nationwide service
network.7 3 The court failed to note that automobile dealers join such networks
62. 100 S. Ct. at 564.
63. Id. at 566-67.

64. 100 S. Ct. at 567.
65. Id.

66. Id. For a general explanation of the stream of commerce theory, see note 55 supra.
67. 100 S. CL at 567.
68. Id. at 568. The Court questioned, but left unresolved, whether proof of the presence
of one of the defendant's products in the forum was sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of continuing contacts. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma based its holding on such a
presumption, noting that, "under the facts we believe it reasonable to infer . . . that
petitioners derive substantial income from automobiles which from time to time are used
in the state of Oklahoma." 585 P.2d at 354.
69. See text accompanying notes 47-52 supra.
70. 100 S. CL at 565-66.
71. The Court did not expressly indicate that fairness was to be secondary to principles
of federalism. However, whether accidental or intentional, the implication was easily drawn
from the Court's enunciation of the tests and their application to the facts. In light of the
Court's expressed desire for predictability in jurisdiction, the emphasis on federalism could
be an attempt to achieve more objectivity. Federalism, unlike the fairness test, does not
involve a subjective evaluation of convenience, forum interest and judicial economy. Rather,
the Court attempted to adapt the reasonable man from tort law to its "reasonably anticipate
being haled before a forum court" test.
72. 100 S. Ct. at 567 n.11 (the Court's discussion of the uniqueness and mobility of the
automobile was limited to one footnote).
73. Id. at 568. The Court rejected the Supreme Court of Oklahoma's reliance on the
nationwide service network by holding it only a collateral relation with the forum, providing
no direct income. No mention was made of the applicability of the stream of commerce
theory. Id.
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to increase the attractiveness of their product as an interstate carrier 7 4 a fact
which, under the stream of commerce theory, would tend to support jurisdiction. The inconsistency between the federalism and stream of commerce
theories, both acknowledged by the present court, is thus self-evident. Federalism requires a narrow view of the commerce clause and relies upon state
sovereignty, while the stream of commerce theory implies a national common
market, immune to state boundaries."
The Court further failed to recognize a significant practical consequence
of the new federalism test. Failure by a defendant to plead improper jurisdiction has traditionally constituted waiver of the issue. 7 6 However, if in personam jurisdiction is constitutionally limited by federalism and state sovereignty, no such waiver is possible, because improper jurisdiction is not an
intrusion merely on the rights of a defendant, but on those of a sister state.
This result contradicts a century of precedent7 7 by elevating in personam
jurisdiction to the level of subject matter jurisdiction,-, thus leaving an improper suit open to dismissal at any stage. 79
In a further practical consideration, ambiguities in the new two pronged
test are certain to interpretively frustrate lower courts. While it is clear that
federalism and fairness are to be distinct inquiries,"" the intended relationship
between the two is far from certain. The Court's reasoning suggests that federalism is a rigid constitutional standard, while fairness is a discretionary
doctrine lacking constitutional magnitude."' It is equally possible, however,
74. Justices Marshall and Blackmun, dissenting, agreed with the test used by the Court
but arrived at contrary conclusions. Both dissents substantially emphasized the intended
mobility of the automobile, the nationwide service network, and the national highway
system. In concluding, the dissents maintained that the defendants not only foresaw use of
their products in other states, but intended and relied upon it. 100 S. Ct. at 568-71.
75. Not only did defendants intend their products to be used in interstate travel, but
absent that ability, they would lose substantial revenues. The Court's failure to recognize
this illustrates the inconsistency. To the Court, federalism requires that jurisdiction be predicated on purposeful availment of forum laws. However, the stream of commerce theory
requires only that a defendant enter its product into interstate travel, not that it know
the ultimate destination. Thus, it would be impossible for the defendant to have availed
itself of forum laws. See note 55 supra.
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1).
77. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). One of the few holdings of this case not
overruled is a defendant's ability to waive personal jurisdiction as a defense. Id. at 721.
Accord, York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890) (a special appearance to contest jurisdiction is
not a right and may be interpreted as a voluntary submission to jurisdiction).
78. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the court's competence to hear and decide issues
concerning the general subject involved in the action. Broughon v. Oceanic Steam Navigation
Co., 205 F. 857, 859 (2d Cir. 1913).
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) "Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."
Id.
80. 100 S. Ct. at 564.
81. See text accompanying notes 47-52 supra. Although the Court was explicit in distinguishing the two prongs of minimum contacts, little direction was given for its application
and the relative importance of each standard. The overall inference is that federalism is the
constitutional standard, while fairness is a discretionary doctrine akin to forum non
conveniens in a venue question. 100 S. Ct. at 564-66.
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that the two inquiries were intended to both be constitutionally based. The
latter construction, more practical and consistent with past doctrine 2 is likely
to be received more favorably by lower courts.8 3 Nevertheless, interpretive
inconsistency is inevitable.
Rejecting the ambiguous federalism-fairness dichotomy,8 4 the Brennan
approach would focus on reasonableness and convenience for the plaintiff.
This approach differs little from the case by case analysis of International
Shoe,s5 despite Brennan's statements to the contrary.8 6 Although superficially
convincing, this approach loses much of its appeal beyond the instant facts
because no consideration is given to the burden of defending in a distant state.8 7
Thus, while this view would indeed provide uniformity, it would do so at the
expense of inevitable inequities for future defendants. 8
The instant case was purportedly an attempt to insure consistency among
lower courts. 8 9 Unfortunately, the Court's reasoning has only confused the
issue and limited the precedential value of the present case to its facts. Ambiguities may be lessened, however, if lower courts interpret federalism and
fairness90 as constitutionally based, similar to the analysis used in International
Shoe.91 Although still imperfect, any de-emphasis of the confusing federalism
rationale will ultimately prove beneficial.
BPiJ.

K. GOODKIND

Forum non conveniens is a discretionary doctrine using the equitable powers of a court
to deny jurisdiction if considerations of convenience and justice require. I J. Mboa,
FErDi.P PRAcncE ff 0.145[2j (2 ed. 1979). This analogy is entirely consistent with the Court's
opinion. In practical application, however, future courts will not likely accord it precedential
value. It is a drastic deviation from past doctrines, and thus, without expressly overruling
or limiting past cases, it will likely go unnoticed. For a discussion of forum non conveniens
and jurisdiction, see generally Morley, Forum Non Conveniens: Restraining Long Arm Jurisdiction, 68 Nw. U. L. Rxv. 24 (1973).
82. See text accompanying notes 8-43 supra.
83. Justice Brennan suggested in his dissent that the Court's "reasonably anticipate being
haled before a forum court" test is circular. A defendant cannot know if it should anticipate
jurisdiction until the Court has declared what the law of jurisdiction is. 100 S. Ct. at 587 n.18.
84. Id. at 581. See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
85. See text accompanying notes 18-24 supra.
86. 100 S. Ct. at 581.
87. Id. at 582.

88. It can be argued that Justice Brennan's test provides for the small defendant by
considering its lack of resources as a factor in the fairness test. However, this is inconsistent
with the dissents explicit rejection of defendant's convenience as a criterion. But cf. Beal v.
Caldwell, 322 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Tenn. 1970) (jurisdiction not permitted over a nonresident
individual who advertised his airplane in a magazine circulating in the forum while communicating with the resident buyer by post and telephone); Darby v. Superior Supply Co.,
224 Tenn. 540, 458 S.W.2d 423 (1970) (jurisdiction not permitted over a nonresident who
consumated a contract by mail in the forum and sent his agent into the state to receive
the goods). For a general discussion of the inadequate bargaining position between corporations and private plaintiffs, see generally von Mehren & Troutman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:
A Suggested Analysis, 79 H.v. L. Rv. 1121 (1966).
89. 100 S. Ct. at 564.
90. See text accompanying notes 47-52, 69-71 supra.
91. See text accompanying notes 18-24 supra.
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